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This paper studies the internationalisation of Chinese piano firms from a branding 
perspective. The purpose of the paper is two folds. Firstly it examines the interplay 
between the country of origin (COO) effect and international branding, and how COO 
affects the choice of branding strategies in international markets. Secondly, it explores 
the possible link between international branding decisions and international expansion 
of the firm. A model is introduced that illustrates the relationships between COO, 
branding options and internationalisation. Corresponding with its progress in the 
internationalisation, a firm‟s branding development in international markets may 
follow certain stages. As the firm moves to advanced stages, it increases its 
international brand equity; the impact from negative COO will decrease and 
eventually become irrelevant. Literature of internationalisation is largely based on the 
experience of MNEs from Western developed countries. Multinational firms from 
developing countries such as China possess some unique characteristics that make it 
very difficult to apply Western theories to them. The emergence of MNEs from 
developing countries calls for the development of new theories.  
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Country of Origin, Branding Strategy and Internationalisation: 
The Case of Chinese Piano Companies 
 
Introduction 
The emergence of China-based multinational companies in the world marketplace has 
drawn an increasing attention from both popular business media and academic 
researchers alike (for example: Cai, 1999; Paul, et al, 2003; Zeng and Williamson, 
2003; Deng, 2004; Business Week, 2004; Wu, 2005; Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Fan, 
2006; Rugman and Li, 2006; Bonaglia and Goldstein, 2007). This paper examines the 
internationalisation of Chinese piano firms from a branding perspective, focusing on 
two related issues: a) the interplay between country of origin effect (COO) and 
branding with an evaluation of the branding options available to Chinese firms; b) the 
potential link between international brand development and internationalisation 
process. COO has been an important consideration in a firm‟s choice of branding 
strategies in the international market. The branding issue in turn has a major impact 
on the selection of the target market and entry mode when the company plans 
international expansion. After an extensive search of literature it is surprising that 
branding issues are largely absent in the published studies of internationalisation. This 
paper attempts to fill in the gap by presenting preliminary findings from a research 
project that investigates the internationalisation of Chinese piano manufacturers.  
 
The Internationalisation of Chinese Enterprises 
The internationalisation of Chinese enterprises has accelerated in the recent years, as 
reflected by three set of figures. Firstly, outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) by 
Chinese firms has increased from one billion US dollars in 2000 to 12.3 billion in 
2005 (MOC, 2006). Secondly, the number of China based multinational enterprises in 
the list of the world‟s largest 500 companies (ranked by sales): there were 16 Chinese 
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MNEs in 2004, compared with only 11 in 2001 (Rugman, 2005). Thirdly, a report 
published by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG, 2006) identifies 100 top companies 
which it terms as “the new global challengers” from rapidly developing economies, 
44 are from China. Pearl River Piano is the only music instrument manufacturer on 
the list. 
With the accession to the WTO in 2003, China‟s economy and Chinese enterprises 
have become increasingly integrated into the world economy. As the result of this, a 
number of internal and external factors propel many Chinese companies into the 
internationalisation process. A survey of China‟s 50 largest industrial firms finds that 
the internal corporate motives provide the greatest impetus for overseas expansion 
while the threat of foreign competition is a big push factor (von Keller and Zhou, 
2003). The report further identifies the following major motivations for 
internationalisation:  56 percent seeking new markets, 20 percent securing resources, 
and 18 percent obtaining new technology including global brands. These findings are 
also echoed in a number of academic studies. For example, Buckley, et al, (2006) 
identify three broad categories of investment strategy adopted by the Chinese MNEs, 
namely market seeking, resources or asset seeking and efficiency seeking strategies.  
 
The internationalisation of Chinese enterprises consists of two stages: inward and 
outward internationalisation (Fan, 2006). Starting between the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the inward internationalisation has been the dominant form via licensing and 
technology transfer agreement, as well as establishing joint ventures. Original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM) exporting can be regarded as a kind of inward 
internationalisation; the great majority of Chinese companies are still at this stage. 
Outward internationalisation in the form of international acquisition and FDI is a 
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relatively new and is certainly in the minority, though such type of events often 
generated more significant international headlines. The recent notable examples 
include successful acquisition of IBM PC business by Lenovo in 2004, acquisition of 
Rover by Nanjing Automobile in 2005, and Haier‟s unsuccessful bid for Maytag in 
2006 (Fan, 2006). In their pursuit of global markets, Chinese companies have adopted 
a variety of strategies and approaches covering a whole spectrum of 
internationalisation, from indirect exporting to full global production and marketing. 
From the branding perspective, there are five preferred methods of overseas 
expansion for Chinese companies seeking to internationalise their business operations, 
they are: OEM exporting, own brand exporting, strategic partnership, acquisition and 
organic growth. Table 1 provides with examples of typical companies that follow 
each strategy. 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
The Chinese Piano Industry 
China is now overtaking Japan and South Korea to become the largest piano producer 
in the world (the People’s Daily, 24/08/2006). According to a survey of 49 firms by 
China Music Instrument Association (www.cmii.com.cn), the total production of 
pianos in 2004 reached to more than 370,000 units (of which 91 percent are upright 
pianos, 9 percent grand). 106,000 (28.6 percent) were exported. Compared with 2003, 
the total production increased by 7.95 percent, the production of grand pianos by 
29.58 percent, and exports grew by 33.32 percent. Table 2 presents the latest statistics 
of piano production and export from China in 2006.  
(Insert Table 2 here) 
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It can be seen from Table 2, the four state owned firms are much larger in terms of 
average production capacity, together accounting for 38.4 percent of total production 
in China. While in export it is the foreign owned enterprises taking the lead with 40 
percent share in total export. It is also interesting to note while the export from the 
state owned firm reduced by almost 20 percent during the period of 2005-06, both 
private and foreign owned firms reported strong growth, 19 percent and 9 percent 
respectively. The Pearl River Group dominates the Chinese market with 60 percent 
share in domestic sales and 50 percent share in export sales. In fact Pearl River has 
become the world largest piano manufacturer with annual production capacity of 
more than 100,000 units, reported by The Music Trades magazine in the U.S.A., and 
confirmed in a report by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG, 2006). Although piano 
sales in China have achieved double-digit growth in the last five years, the market has 
great potential (less than two per cent ownership compared to 25 per cent in Japan). 
Competition has intensified as the total number of piano makers jumped from 16 in 
1998 to more than 120 in 2004 (Anonymous, 2004). The data from top Chinese piano 
manufacturers is summarised in Table 3. 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
They share the following characteristics: 
 Being state owned enterprises 
 Having foreign partners or technical assistance  
 Having modern production facilities 
 Key components/parts imported from abroad 
 Having obtained ISO9001 certificate 1 
 Most exporting under OEM contracts 
 
Collaboration with foreign firms in the form of international joint ventures and other 
alliances, plus the employment of foreign technical experts, has played a significant 
role in the transformation of China‟s piano industry. Chinese firms have benefited 
greatly from the technology transfer which helped to modernise their production 
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capability and narrow the gap between Chinese piano makers and international 
competition (Anonymous, 2004). Although no specific data of piano industry is 
available, the data published by the State Bureau of Statistics of China (SBSC, 2003) 
shows that Chinese firms have made significant progress between 1998 and 2002: the 
productivity gap between foreign and local Chinese firms has dropped from 5.25 to 
3.29; and the gap in new product development has dropped from 2.5 to 1.8. As for the 
quality of Chinese made pianos, remarkable progress has been achieved over the last 
10 years and the gap between Chinese and Japanese products has been narrowed 
(Anonymous, 2004). This is evidenced in the fact that Steinway & Sons has recently 
made the decision to shift the production of its Essex brands pianos from Korea‟s 
Young Chang to Pearl River in China. Similarly, another American company Baldwin 
also started production in China with the acquisition of a local firm (the People’s 
Daily, 24/08/2006). 
 
As piano making is still a labour intensive industry Chinese manufacturers enjoy such 
a big cost advantage that their price is even lower than the cost of their competitors. 
For example, a small grand piano Yamaha GB1 can be bought in the UK market for 
£5,174 (RRP £7,499). The Chinese-made grand piano of a similar size and 
specification is priced at £3,500 but the F.O.B. price quoted from Dongbei Piano is 
only £820 (based on the author‟s inquiry to a local dealer). This would give the 
dealers a huge incentive to stock Chinese pianos. Two biggest problems facing 
Chinese piano firms are technical innovation and branding (Anonymous, 2004). 
Chinese companies “think branding is important, and they want to understand what a 
brand is. But they don‟t have any experience” (Business Week, 10/11/2004). This may 
sound quite harsh, but is a fair assessment. The majority of 200 plus piano brands in 
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the Chinese market are no more than just a registered name. They lack some key 
attributes in a real brand. This lack of branding competence is even more problematic 
in the international market. The main strengths and weaknesses of Chinese piano 
manufacturers are summarised in Table 4. This is in line with other studies that 
assessed Chinese firms in general. For example, Nolan (2004) finds little evidence 
that Chinese firms can develop knowledge of the systems integration skills that 
characterise successful Western MNEs. Chinese firms tend to be protected, resource 
based, labour intensive, low technology and inefficient.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
It can be seen from Table 4 that the majority of strengths enjoyed by Chinese piano 
makers are cost or location based. Their main weaknesses show that they lack of firm 
specific advantages such as technology, branding and expertise in international 
marketing. Two points from the Table deserve special attention. Firstly, low cost 
production, to which the economies of scale is partly related, is often cited as one of 
the most important competitive advantages that Chinese companies have. However, 
with international competitors such as Yamaha, Kawai and Young Chang all having  
established production facilities within China, low cost is no longer a Chinese 
monopoly. Facing intensified competition at home, it is imperative for Chinese firms 
to address their main competitive disadvantage in branding both at home and abroad. 
Secondly, support from the government has been widely regarded as playing a crucial 
role in the internationalisation of Chinese firms. But it could be easily overlooked that 
the government has played a double role of facilitator and obstructer at the same time 
in the development of Chinese multinationals. Ma (2005) believes that the lack of 
proper institutional environment is the main reason why China has still not produced 
real multinational firms.  
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Country Of Origin (COO) Effect 
COO refers to the impact which generalisations and perceptions about a country have 
on a person‟s evaluations of the country‟s products and brands (Nebenzahl, et al, 
1997; Lampert and Jaffe, 1998; Dinnie, 2000). COO was once a relatively simple 
concept when the product was made in the home country of the manufacturer. With 
the expansion of MNEs and the growth in global production and sourcing over the last 
two decades, it is now difficult to ascertain the origin of a specific product as the 
product may now have different multinational origins which gives COO very 
complicated meaning (Usunier, 2003). A product may be designed in country A, 
manufactured in country B using parts from countries C, D and E, and sold in the 
international market with a brand that is originally from country X but now owned by 
country Y. For example, what is the country-of-origin of Dell computers? Given the 
complexity in origin, it is useful to distinguish the country of origin of pianos between 
the following:  
 Country of design, e.g. German scale designer; 
 Country of production, e.g. Pearl River, made in China; 
 Country of assembly, e.g. Yamaha, made in China; 
 Country of key components, e.g. Renner actions from Germany; 
 Country of brand origin, e.g. Essex piano by Steinway, USA. 
 
Many different makes of pianos bear the label of “Made in China” but have 
significant differences in their actual origin. It is worth noting that of the six 
categories of exports from China shown in Table 5, only three (2, 3 and 4) can be 
termed as Chinese pianos. 
There are several factors affecting the interplay between COO and brand but the most 
important one is the strength of the brand in the target market. To a well-established 
global brand the impact of COO is increasingly becoming insignificant or irrelevant. 
It is now a trend for multinational companies to re-brand in order to de-emphasise or 
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conceal their country of origin so as to emphasise their global image, to name a few: 
BA, KFC and HSBC. Consumers are either unaware of or not bothered to know the 
origin of a brand, for example, whether Nokia is Finnish or Japanese.  
A recent study on Samsung finds that country image does not showcase any 
significant impact on brand image and purchase intention if the brand concerned is an 
established one (Kim, 2006). On the other hand, if the brand is new to the market, 
COO will have a primary impact on the brand evaluation as it becomes an integral 
part of a brand‟s image, exerting enormous influence on the consumer‟s perception of 
the brand, rather than being just one of group “secondary associations” (Keller, 1993). 
COO helps or hampers the development of brand equity in the new market. Brands 
from developing countries are especially vulnerable to the negative COO effect as 
numerous studies have shown a consistent consumer bias in favour of products from 
countries with higher level of economic development (Papadopoulos and Heslop, 
1993). The biggest problem facing Chinese piano manufacturers in international 
markets is the negative perception of the “Made in China” label; and the dilemma is 
that there is little they can do about it as individual firms or even as an industry 
together. It requires China to change her country image in general and this may take 
many years, a generation‟s time in the case of Japan.  
 
International Branding Strategies 
Chinese piano companies have three choices when exporting to international markets 
(Onkvisit and Shaw, 1989):  
1. Branding or No-branding 
2. Creating versus Acquiring 
3. Single versus Multiple Brands 
 
Firstly they have to decide whether to use their own brands or to sell under a third 
party‟s name, i.e. private branding. Like many other Chinese-made consumer goods 
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in international markets, the majority of Chinese pianos sold abroad are under the 
distributor‟s brands; Chinese firms are original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). 
OEM is the easiest mode to enter a new foreign market, probably the only practical 
way when the firm lacks marketing experience and brand recognition in the target 
market. However, the OEM mode has serious drawbacks in the long term. Strictly 
speaking, OEM is not a real export activity but a form of contract manufacturing or 
production under license. The product and brand are owned by the foreign firm who 
has control over marketing and pockets much larger profit margin. Opinions are 
divided as to whether now is the right time for the Chinese companies to create their 
own brands in the world market (Fan, 2006). For example, Galanz, the world‟s largest 
manufacturer and exporter of microwave ovens adopted a policy of OEM first, 
branding second. The marketing director of the company was quoted as saying: 
“What is a brand? A brand is made of a pot of gold. How much gold do we have? We 
cannot afford to develop a brand in the world market at the moment so we have to do 
OEM.” Galanz‟s stated goal is to become the world‟s largest factory 
(www.globrand.com). This OEM option may prove to be a costly mistake as many 
companies in Hong Kong and Taiwan learned a hard lesson when they found it much 
more difficult to develop their own brands at a later stage. The problems for most 
developing country MNEs is that they entered as OEM the global marketplace at the 
bottom of the value curve and stuck there, because of lack of brand (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 2000). Acer Computer is a notable example. An OEM company having no 
exposure to the international market may risk losing the opportunity to develop its 
own brand internationally (Keegan and Green, 2004). Seeking sustainable global 
positions developing country MNEs need to go beyond being OEM to become 
primary suppliers, to move beyond cost-based advantages and enhance their 
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marketing capabilities (BCG, 2006). It is crucial for them to develop new competence 
in branding in order to move up the more profitable segment (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
2000). 
Once the firm decides to use its own brand in the international market, it could have a 
further choice of creating/developing its own brand or buying an international brand. 
For example, Samick-Korea‟s second largest piano maker has recently purchased a 
premium brand C. Bechstein. In China, Dongbei Piano acquired Swedish brand 
Nordiska and uses it in both domestic and export markets. While there is little doubt 
that an internationally recognised name will help the sales of an unknown producer, 
the benefit of using acquired brands in the long term is called into question. Yamaha, 
like many Japanese companies in other sectors, has concentrated on building its own 
brand equity in international markets. Even in their early stage of internationalisation, 
Japanese firms did not use acquired brands, instead creating their own new Western 
sounding brand names to replace their corporate names (e.g. Matsushita used brands 
Panasonic and National in international markets). It is not clear how, or if it is even 
possible, to transfer the brand value from an acquired brand to a weak brand, but there 
are quite a few cases of failed attempts, Malaysian firm Proton‟s brief ownership of 
Lotus and Samsung‟s purchase of Rollei. What is clear, however, is that acquired 
brands produce a short-cut to overcome the negative COO; but it is not a substitute or 
alternative for brand building in the long term.   
 
The third issue is whether to use a single brand (like Yamaha) in all different country 
markets and across different segments, or use multiple brands in a single market or 
different brands targeting different markets and segments. A single brand policy will 
have the advantages of economies of scales in marketing, helping brand recognition 
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and ensuring consistency in brand image across different markets, whilst the multiple 
branding approach is based on the assumption that the market consists of several 
segments that need to be served differently. Pearl River has adopted a dual brand 
policy selling under both Pearl River and Ritmuller names in the American market. 
The firm is now facing a branding dilemma, that is whether to invest in Pearl River or 
Ritmuller as the latter is not a strong brand itself. A brand needs to be contemporary 
to be related to the consumer. Ritmuller, as a mature brand, would need huge 
investment to bring it up to date. Chinese computer company Lenovo faced the 
similar problem after acquiring IBM PC business and the ThinkPad brand. Lenovo is 
a strong brand in China and has also a number of sub-brands at product line level. The 
company has decided to concentrate its efforts on building a corporate master brand 
Lenovo in both domestic and international markets rather than spreading too thin the 
limited resources on sub-brands (People‟s Daily, 2006)   
 
COO and Branding Strategies 
With regard to COO, the consumer‟s perception will differ depending on the 
product/brand and the country. As an external cue to the buyer, country image can 
play a big part in the overall acceptance or rejection of the product, particularly if the 
brand is new and unfamiliar to the market (Han, 1989). That is exactly the situation 
facing most Chinese exporters. However, China‟s country image has been gradually 
improved since the biggest setback in 1989.  In fact Chinese-made products have 
gained a lot of ground in recent years in terms of consumer acceptance, as more and 
more consumer goods are being manufactured by MNEs in China though few of them 
are sold under Chinese brands. In the North American market, Chinese brands such as 
Haier, Lenovo and SVA have helped create positive COO effect, from which other 
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Chinese companies would certainly benefit (Fan, 2006). In international markets, a 
number of branding options are open to Chinese piano manufacturers: 
 Where COO is positive, use own brands 
 Where COO is neutral, use own brands or Western sounding names  
 Where COO is slight negative, use acquired brands  
 Where COO is very negative, sell under the dealer‟s brands 
 
As most Chinese brands lack awareness in international markets, COO becomes 
prominent in shaping the consumer‟s perception. Consumers use COO in effect to 
compensate for their lack of knowledge or familiarity with the brand. Thus high 
familiarity reduces the impact which COO information may have on a product 
evaluation (Han, 1989; Papadopolous and Heslop, 1993). To make the right branding 
work, Chinese piano firms should invest more in marketing communications targeting 
at key audiences -opinion leaders such as music teachers and music media etc. The 
author has talked to a half dozen of piano dealers in England and found that many of 
them were motivated to stock Chinese made pianos because of a larger margin. But to 
new piano buyers in developed country markets such as the UK, a stronger influence 
comes from music teachers, and many of them advise their students not to buy 
Chinese-made instruments. To overcome this difficulty, the communication should try 
to focus on: a) using western-sounding brand names to obscure the Made-in-China 
image, and b) emphasising the quality in design and production to benefit from 
positive COO. For example, Longfeng Piano could emphasise that its Kingsburg 
model was designed by the world-renowned German master designer Klaus Fenner. 
 
Branding and Internationalisation  
Internationalisation refers to the gradual and incremental pattern of a firm‟s expansion 
into foreign markets. The process of internationalisation has been encapsulated in the 
literature by different schools of thought such as FDI theory, stage models, and more 
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recently the network perspective. The stage models are based on the assumption that 
internationalisation is a gradual and incremental process that typically consists of the 
following stages (Bilkey and Tesar, 1977; Wortzel and Wortzel, 1981; Cavusgil, 
1982): 
1. No interest /involvement in exporting 
2. Reactive involvement/indirect exporting 
3. Active involvement/more direct exporting 
4. Establishing a marketing subsidiary in the target market  
5. At most advanced point, establishing a manufacturing plant 
 
In the mainstream literature of internationalisation, the focus is on explanation of how 
it happens (process) and why it happens (for example, advantages seeking (Dunning 
(1995)), branding is not considered. But from managerial perspective, it is clear that 
brand equity and international branding plays an important part in decision making in 
the process of internationalisation, particularly in the selection of which market to 
enter and choice of entry mode. It can be hypothesised that corresponding with its 
progress in the internationalisation process; a firm‟s branding development in the 
international market may also follow certain distinctive stages: 
1. Domestic branding 
2. OEM exporting 
3. Self branding and OEM 
4. International branding 
5. Global branding 
 
The relationship between international brand development and the internationalisation 
of the firm is illustrated in Figure 1. Most Chinese piano companies are at Stages 1 or 
2. The basic theory is that at Stage 2, although the firm is ready to compete in the 
international market in terms of production competence and product quality, it is 
seriously unprepared for the new challenge with lack of critical marketing and 
branding know-how. To Chinese piano companies, international branding, like the 
internationalisation itself, is a learning process in which they have to acquire new 
knowledge and core competence for international markets. Moving further along the 
process the firm becomes a more committed exporter, it also develops branding 
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competence and confidence as it changes from an OEM exporter to direct exporter 
using its own brand name. With the increase in the firm‟s international brand equity, 
the impact from negative country of origin effect will decrease; and eventually a 
turnaround will take place. When the firm has built up sufficient brand equity, the 
country of origin image becomes less relevant;  and at a late stage, the positive brand 
image could even help create positive COO.  
 
Pearl River is the only Chinese piano maker that has advanced to the third stage. This 
is the crucial stage that will decide the long term success or failure of 
internationalisation. Following a hybrid strategy in international expansion, i.e.  being 
both OEM and own brand exporter, companies at this stage face a dilemma at two 
fronts. Firstly, conflicts may occur with its OEM customers as the firm attempts to 
over-emphasise its own-branded products in the target marketplaces (Cheng, et al., 
2005). Secondly, consumers may be confused by the firm‟s overall brand image and 
positioning.  While continuing to be an OEM supplier to the lower end of market, the 
firm struggles to establish itself in its own brands in the middle or higher end of 
market. To mover up further into the next stage- the international branding  stage, 
Pearl River has to manage a fine balance between its OEM commitment and 
developing its own brand portfolio, taking a gradual reduction of OEM contracts in 
order to concentrate more on developing its brand equity internationally (Cheng, et 
al., 2005) 
 
International brand development is not a rational process, but unclear, complex, 
continuously changing … where strategies emerge out of interplay between actors in 
the foreign market and the focal firm (Johanson and Vahlne, 1992). If this is the case, 
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it means that the firm may not necessarily follow a single predetermined path step by 
step. It may be possible for some firms to skip certain steps and leapfrog to a higher 
stage. Not every firm could succeed in moving up the stage in the process. It has taken 
Yamaha more than 30 years to reach the final stage in becoming a truly global leading 
brand. It would be interesting to study how Yamaha and other Japanese firms 
succeeded while many exporters in Taiwan and Hong Kong, whose economy took off 
at the same time as Japan, failed to produce a single global brand. Many of these firms 
remain stuck at the OEM stage.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
China has overtaken Japan within the last decade to become the world‟s largest 
manufacturer and exporter of consumer goods. However, China has not yet created a 
single global brand, i.e. a brand that is recognised worldwide. China does need to own 
a sizeable number of global brands for her continuous economic growth and 
prosperity. Facing problems in the domestic market of intense competition and 
overcapacity, more and more Chinese companies share the same understanding that 
they have to „go global‟ for future growth and profitability, and  must succeed 
globally in order to win the domestic market. Only 10 per cent of China‟s top 50 firms 
by sales have yet to formulate an overseas expansion plan, according to a recent 
consultancy report (Prystay, 2003).  
 
Globalisation strategy involves a wide spectrum of commitment and control, and 
requires the firm to strike a fine balance between benefits and risk as well as long 
term and short-term objectives (Luostarinen, 1979; Cavusgil and Godiwalla, 1982). It 
is clear from Figure 1 that Chinese piano companies have arrived at the different 
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stages in internationalisation by different routes. While export is the low-cost and 
low-risk mode, overseas production offers many advantages, such as circumventing 
tariff barriers and anti-dumping charges. In developing a global brand Chinese 
companies could choose between a traditional and modern approach (Ewing, et al, 
2001). The traditional approach is conservative one that starts from local, to regional 
and finally global: a slow incremental process. This is typified by majority of Chinese 
piano companies. In contrast, Chinese electronic companies such as TCL and Lenovo 
have adopted the modern (though more risky) approach that accelerates 
internationalisation via joint ventures and acquisition of foreign brands, enabling them 
to leapfrog to the advanced stage in the process. In target market selection, most 
Chinese companies have started with the neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia, 
perceived to be relatively easy due to smaller geographic and psychic distance. Pearl 
River, however, took the opposite approach of tackling a more difficult market of the 
USA first, and has so far made good progress. The company has built its own 
distribution network with more than 300 dealers and become the fast growing 
company in the North American market with about 20 percent market share 
(www.pearlriverusa.com/pr_story.html).  
 
There are also differences in their marketing mix strategies. Most Chinese piano 
exporters still concentrate on low end of the market with low price, but this strategy 
has not always worked in the developed country markets and further reinforced the 
negative stereotype of COO, which makes it more difficult to overcome in the later 
stage when the firm wants to move up the market. To sell a fairly standard product 
like piano in highly competitive international markets, low price is no longer 
sufficient. They need to have innovative marketing strategies and strong branding 
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efforts (Oh, et al, 1998). An alternative to low price strategy is developing brands plus 
effective targeting (Brouthers and Xu, 2002). Chinese piano companies could learn 
from Chinese television exporters. For example, SVA decided to focus on high-end 
products with a medium pricing strategy, which seems to have worked well by 
bypassing direct competition from both brand competition at the top end and price 
competition at the lower end (Fan, 2006). In branding and advertising, Chinese piano 
companies have adopted a low-key trade promotion strategy, rather than expensive 
above the line advertising. This is a problem they have to address in order to create 
brand awareness in the target segments. 
 
Chinese piano companies have a long journey in the internationalisation process, 
given the complexity, cost, uncertainty and fierce competition in creating and 
sustaining their brand names in international markets. There is no clear or simple best 
way to succeed. Compared with their Western counterparts, Chinese companies have 
competitive advantages in low-cost production, sourcing, distribution and service. 
China‟s vast domestic market brings economies of scale and domestic rivalry. Many 
markets in small cities, towns and rural areas remain untapped or under-developed. 
Chinese companies are disadvantaged in terms of their lack of core technology, 
design and innovation, branding and knowledge of managing large complex 
businesses. Many still have not truly grasped the art of marketing and brand building 
in the Western sense of the word. They are aware of the necessity, but not of how to 
do it (Cass Creative Report, 2004). As late comers they may struggle to obtain the 
advantages of an integrated global strategy and face greater problems than the existing 
players, particularly in the area of knowledge transfer and dissemination (Zhu, 2007).  
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There is an urgent need for Chinese piano firms to develop or acquire new 
competence. In an earlier study of internationalisation of five state-owned enterprises 
in China, Young et al. (1996) emphasise that Chinese companies have to undergo a 
formidable process of education, training and cultural learning (quite apart from the 
initial capital investment requirement) if the R&D, manufacturing and marketing 
know-how acquired is to be assimilated throughout the corporation. The biggest 
challenge for late comer firms is how to create new competitive advantages in the 
market. Organisation learning is crucial for them to fulfil a successful catch up 
strategy, and this learning process is likely to be long and expensive, especially where 
the technology continues to advance rapidly and competition from the incumbent 
firms remains fierce (Zhu, et al., 2007). Late comer firms must be good at learning 
and accumulating new knowledge and expertise in order to move from cost based 
competencies and location-based advantages to ownership or firm specific advantages 
(Pangarker, 1998; Mathews, 2002; Sim and Pandian, 2003; Cross and Voss, 2006). 
The key to the success of developing country MNEs has been the ability to treat 
global competition as an opportunity to build capabilities, move into more profitable 
industry segments and adopt strategies that turn latecomer status into a sources of 
competitive advantage (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 2006; 
Bonaglia, et al, 2007). Chinese companies should learn from all available sources but 
this learning should not be regarded as simple mechanical imitations of the market 
leaders. Instead they should strive to develop new thinking and new approaches that 
combine the best of East and West (Fan, 1998). In international marketing, they can 
learn probably more from Japanese or Korean companies (Taylor, et al 2000; Cho, et 
al, 1994). For Chinese piano companies, the success of Yamaha provides a good 
model to follow. 
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There is as yet very limited research on the multinational firms from Asia or those 
from developing countries (Erramilli, et al, 1999; Sim and Pandian, 2003; Ramamurti, 
2004). Developing country MNEs are different from their counterparts in developed 
countries in their characteristics and behaviour. The main area of difference stems 
from the nature of competitive advantages possessed by developing country MNEs 
which have internationalised in ways that do not simply recapitulate the experience of 
earlier MNEs that are the incumbents today (Pananond and Zeithhaml, 1998; 
Pangakar, 1998; Mathews, 2002; Bonagolia, et al, 2007). For example, the 
mainstream theory of FDI claims that the possession of some kind of firm-specific 
advantages, such as proprietary technology, products and brands, is the key factor in 
explaining the international expansion patterns of the firm (Dunning, 1995). But in the 
case of Chinese firms, most of their advantages are location-specific rather than firm-
specific. The problem faced by many Chinese MNEs is that, once they are in 
international markets, they will be cut off from the sources of their existing 
competitive advantages derived largely from the low cost base at home. Contrary to 
the assumption that firms internationalise to exploit competitive advantages, for many 
Chinese firms, to internationalise means seeking competitive disadvantages. In other 
words, they have to develop or acquire new firm-specific advantages first before 
embarking on international expansion. This raises a serious question of whether the 
extant theory of internationalisation and competitive strategy that is based on the 
experience of developed country MNEs can be applied to developing country MNEs. 
Child and Ridrigues (2005) suggest that the Chinese scenario offers an opportunity to 
extend present theories, particularly in the areas of the latecomer perspective and 
catch-up strategies. This will be a good starting point, but a mere extension to the 
existing Western-based theories may prove insufficient in the long term. The 
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emergence of MNEs from developing countries calls for the development of new 
theories.  
This paper examines the country of origin effect and its impact on branding decisions 
in the international market. Various branding options for Chinese piano manufacturers 
are analysed and the link between branding and the internationalisation process is 
discussed. Figure 1 is a useful addition to the literature as the model helps to have a 
better understanding of the relationship between COO, branding and 
internationalisation. More research is needed in this vital area to identify the key 
factors that influence the evolution of the international brand development and to test 
the model through empirical research. Two questions of particular interests are: 1) 
when should a company decide to change from OEM exporter to developing its own 
brand in a foreign market?  2) Should international branding follow the same learning 
curve as the firm evolves along the process, or is it possible for some firms to leapfrog 
to the advanced stage? 
 
End Note 
1. ISO 9000 refers to a family of standards for quality management systems that 
is maintained by ISO, the International Organization for Standardization. For 
more details see http://www.iso.org/iso/about.htm 
 
2. American firm Gibson Guitar Corp has acquired 100 percent ownership of 
Dongbei at the end of 2006, renaming the company as Balwin Dongbei Piano 
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Table 1. Different Routes in Internationalisation  
 
Route Typical Company  Major sector 
1. OEM exporting Galanz Microwave oven 
2. Own brand exporting SVA TV 
3. Strategic partnership TCL TV 
4. Acquisition  Lenovo PC 
5. Organic growth via FDI Haier Refrigerator  
 




Table 2 Chinese Piano Production and Export in 2006 
 
Type of Ownership State Private Foreign Total 
Number of Firms 4 22 11 37 
































































Share in total production % 38.40 27.28 34.42 100 
Share in total export % 34.0 26.0 40.0 100 
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Table 4 The Strengths and Weaknesses of Chinese Piano Companies 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 Low cost production 
 Economies of scale (due to a large 
            domestic market) 
 Modern production facilities 
 Improving quality 
 Price advantage 
 Good work force 
 Strong financial position 
 Government support 
 No brand awareness abroad 
 Lack of branding expertise 
 Negative country of origin effect 
 Little experience in direct 
exporting 
 Lack of understanding of foreign 
markets 
 Reliance on foreign technology 
 Weak ability in innovation 
 Lack of foreign distribution 
network 
 Difficulty in international 
promotion 
 
Source: compiled by the author from various sources in Chinese 
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Table 5 A Classification of Pianos “Made in China” 
 
 Production-exporting  Branding  Example 
1 Made by a Chinese firm but sold 





Essex made by 
Pearl River for 
Steinway 
 
2 Made by a Chinese firm but sold 
under a foreign distributor‟s 
name 
 
Private branding Otto Meister  
 
3 Made by a Chinese firm and sold 
under Chinese manufacturer‟s 






4 Made by a Chinese firm and sold 









5 Made in a joint venture but sold 






6 Made in a foreign invested 
company and sold under the 





Source: by the author 
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 International  
 Brand Equity 
 




             (Yamaha) 
      (Young Chang) 
      
  
     
                                           
                                          Pearl River 
           Xinghai 
   
  
  No  Experimental Active   Committed 
  Involvement Involvement  Involvement Involvement 
 
          Domestic        Export by         Self Branding+       International        Global 
             Marketing        OEM only                OEM          Branding             Branding 
 




Source: by the author 
Overseas Production 
      Home Production 
Full Globalisation 
